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Abstract
Fuzzy autoepistemic logic is a generalization of au-
toepistemic logic, an important formalism for non-
monotonic reasoning originally intended to model
an ideally rational agent reflecting upon his own
beliefs, and allows to represent an agent’s ratio-
nal beliefs on partially true gradable propositions.
Fuzzy autoepistemic logic has recently been shown
to be a suitable logical framework for fuzzy an-
swer set programming, generalizing a classical re-
sult. On the other hand, there are well-known links
between autoepistemic logic and several nonmono-
tonic modal logic systems. In this paper, we intro-
duce generalizations of the main classical propo-
sitional modal logics of belief based on finitely-
valued Łukasiewicz calculus. We obtain complete-
ness with respect to appropriate Kripke-style se-
mantics and we prove NP-completeness for the sat-
isfiability problem. Then we show how fuzzy au-
toepistemic logic can be approached in these many-
valued modal settings. In particular we obtain
a generalization of Levesque’s result on the rela-
tionship between stable expansions, belief sets and
“only knowing” operators.
1 Introduction and motivation
Since its introduction in the 1980s, autoepistemic logic
[Moore, 1983; Konolige, 1994; Shvarts, 1990] has been one
of the main formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. It ex-
tends propositional logic by offering the ability to reason
about an agent’s (lack of) beliefs. More precisely, these be-
liefs are sets of sentences in a propositional language aug-
mented by a modal operator B. If ϕ is a formula, then Bϕ,
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which has to be interpreted as “ϕ is believed”, is a formula
as well. Hence, in this language nested modal operators are
allowed; it is possible to have beliefs about beliefs.
Logic programming has had a significant impact on the de-
velopment of nonmonotonic logics and vice versa (e.g. [Baral
and Gelfond, 1994]). In particular, Gelfond and Lifschitz
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] showed that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the answer sets of an answer
set program and the stable expansions of a corresponding au-
toepistemic theory. In [Moore, 1983], a stable expansion of a
set of autoepistemic formulasA is defined as a set of formulas
EA such that the following fix-point condition holds:
EA = {ϕ | A ∪ {Bψ | ψ ∈ EA} ∪ {¬Bψ | ψ /∈ EA} ` ϕ} ,
where ` denotes derivability in classical propositional logic
and each formula Bϕ is considered as a new propositional
variable. Informally, a stable expansion of A is a closed set
of beliefs of an ideal rational agent based on the premises A.
In [Levesque, 1990], a modal logic account of main con-
cepts of Moore’s autoepistemic logic is provided, and in par-
ticular a K45 modal logic of belief is expanded with a new
unary modality O where Oϕ has to be interpreted as “ϕ is
all that is believed” or “only ϕ is believed”. It is then shown
that “only believing” (or “only knowing”) is closely related
to stable expansions in autoepistemic logic.
Recently, a fuzzy generalization (from a semantical point
of view) of autoepistemic logic has been defined in [Blondeel
et al., 2013] where it is also shown that the important relation
between autoepistemic logic and answer set programming is
preserved: the answer sets of a fuzzy answer set program (e.g.
[Van Nieuwenborgh et al., 2007]) can be equivalently deter-
mined by computing the fuzzy stable expansions of a corre-
sponding set of fuzzy autoepistemic formulas.
In this paper, we introduce generalizations of the main
classical propositional modal logics of belief (K45, KD45,
S5) based on finitely-valued Łukasiewicz calculus in order to
model the notion of belief on fuzzy propositions, in the sense
of admitting partial degrees of truth between 0 (fully false)
and 1 (fully true). For instance suppose the expression “I be-
lieve it is raining” has truth value 0.2. This is interpreted as
“I believe to degree 0.2 that it is raining”, or as can be shown
by the definitions we will introduce as “I (fully) believe that
it is raining to at least degree 0.2”. For practical and tech-
nical reasons we consider truth degrees belonging to a finite
scale Sk = {0, 1k , . . . , k−1k , 1}. Then we show how fuzzy
autoepistemic logic can be approached using possible worlds
semantics corresponding to these many-valued modal logics.
We also consider the expansion of our many-valued K45 with
an “only believing” operator O and show that Levesque’s re-
sult on the relationship between stable expansions, belief sets
and “only knowing” operators nicely extends to our frame-
work.
This paper is structured as follows. After this introduc-
tion, in Section 2, we provide some necessary preliminaries
on the (k+ 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic Łk and available re-
sults on the minimal modal logic over Łk. In Section 3 we
define proper generalizations of the classical modal systems
K45, KD45 and S5 and prove sound- and completeness with
respect to appropriate Kripke-style semantics, while in Sec-
tion 4 we deal with the complexity of these logics and prove
NP-completeness for two variants of the satisfiability prob-
lem. Then in Section 5 we consider possible world semantics
for the fuzzy autoepistemic logic of [Blondeel et al., 2013]
and provide a characterization of fuzzy stable expansions in
terms of many-valued K45 belief sets, and also in terms of
proper generalizations of stable sets. In Section 6, we gen-
eralize (from a semantical point of view) the propositional
fragment of Levesque’s “only knowing” logic and prove that
there is a characterization of fuzzy stable expansions in terms
of the belief sets involving the “only knowing” operator O.
We conclude with some final remarks about related work.
2 Background
Consider the propositional language L whose formulas are
built from a countable set of propositional variables V , the
connective → (implication) and truth constants c for each
c ∈ Sk = {0, 1k , . . . , k−1k , 1} with a fixed k ∈ N. Further
connectives are defined as follows:
¬φ = φ→ 0 φ ∧ ψ = φ⊗ (φ→ ψ)
φ⊗ ψ = ¬(φ→ ¬ψ) φ⊕ ψ = ¬(¬φ⊗ ¬ψ)
φ ∨ ψ = ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ) φ↔ ψ = (φ→ ψ)⊗ (ψ → φ)
with φ and ψ arbitrary formulas. A propositional evaluation
is a mapping e : V → Sk that is extended to formulas as
follows. If φ and ψ are formulas and c is an element in Sk,
then
e(φ→ ψ) = e(φ)⇒ e(ψ) and e(c) = c,
where x ⇒ y = min(1, 1 − x + y) for x, y ∈ Sk. Note
that (x ⇒ y) = 1 iff x ≤ y. The set of all such evaluations
will be henceforth denoted by Ωk. Notice that, in particular,
for every formula φ and ψ and for every e ∈ Ωk, we have
e(¬φ) = 1 − e(φ), e(φ ⊗ ψ) = max(e(φ) + e(ψ) − 1, 0),
e(φ ∨ ψ) = max(e(φ), e(ψ)), e(φ ∧ ψ) = min(e(φ), e(ψ)),
e(φ ⊕ ψ) = min(1, e(φ) + e(ψ)) and e(φ ↔ ψ) = 1 −
|(e(φ)− e(ψ)|.
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if there is some propo-
sitional evaluation e such that e(φ) = 1. In such a case we
say that e is a model of φ. A tautology is a formula φ such
that e(φ) = 1 for each propositional evaluation e. A formula
φ is a semantic consequence of a set of formulas Γ, written
as Γ |= φ iff it holds that if e is a model of each formula in
Γ, then e is also a model of φ. The logic Łk based on the
language L has a sound and a strongly complete axiomatiza-
tion, see e.g. [Cignoli et al., 2000] for details. So if ` denotes
the notion of proof defined from the set of axioms of Łk and
modus ponens, then for any, hence possibly infinite, set of
formulas T ∪ {ψ}, it holds that T ` ψ iff T |= ψ. A formula
ψ that can be proven from axioms and rules only is called a
theorem and this is written as ` ψ.
To reason with beliefs over fuzzy propositions we intro-
duce a modal operator B. By LB we denote the expansion of
L by B. We base our approach on previous theoretical work
[Bou et al., 2011b] on fuzzy modal logics where the truth-
values form a finite residuated lattice. In [Bou et al., 2011b],
the authors introduce the minimal modal logic over Łk. Its
axioms are all the axioms of Łk, plus the following.
(B2) (Bϕ ∧ Bψ)→ B(ϕ ∧ ψ) ,
(B3) B(c→ ϕ)↔ (c→ Bϕ), for each c ∈ Sk ,
(B4) (Bϕ⊕ Bϕ)↔ B(ϕ⊕ ϕ) .
The rules are modus ponens (from φ and φ→ ψ infer ψ) and
monotonicity for B (if φ→ ψ is a theorem then Bφ→ Bψ is
a theorem as well). In [Bou et al., 2011b], the authors show
that this is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect
to the class of Kripke framesM = (W, e,R) whereW is a set
of possible worlds, e : W × V → Sk is a mapping giving an
evaluation e(w, ·) : V → Sk for each possible world w and
R : W ×W → Sk is a Sk-valued binary relation on possible
worlds. Given a (Kripke) frame M = (W, e,R) and a world
w ∈ W , the truth value of a formula φ in LB is inductively
defined as follows:
• If φ is a propositional variable p, then ‖φ‖M,w =
e(w, p).
• If φ is truth-constant c, then ‖φ‖M,w = c.
• If φ = Bψ, then ‖φ‖M,w = inf{R(w,w′)⇒ ‖ψ‖M,w′ |
w′ ∈W}.
• If φ = ψ → γ, then ‖φ‖M,w = ‖ψ‖M,w ⇒ ‖γ‖M,w.
The third bullet then intuitively expresses that ψ is believed
in a world w ∈ W to the degree that ψ is true in all worlds
w′ that are accessible (related to) from w to a certain degree.
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if there exists a frame
M = (W, e,R) and a w ∈ W such that ‖φ‖M,w = 1 and
we say that φ is satisfied by M . It is called a tautology if for
each frame M = (W, e,R) we have ‖φ‖M,w = 1 for each
w ∈ W . A formula φ is a semantic consequence of a set of
formulas Γ, written as Γ |=B φ iff it holds that if each formula
in Γ is satisfied by a frame M , that φ is also satisfied by M .
As it was shown in [Bou et al., 2011b], the well-known
axiom
(K) B(φ→ ψ)→ (Bφ→ Bψ)
is not generally sound in the above Kripke frames, only in
frames M = (W, e,R) where R is a two-valued relation on
M (i.e. when R(w,w′) ∈ {0, 1} for all w,w′ ∈ W ). Notice
that in such Kripke frames, the truth evaluation of Bφ in a
world w ∈W reduces to
‖Bφ‖M,w = inf{‖φ‖M,w′ | R(w,w′) = 1}.
In the remainder of the paper we will be interested in the class
of Kripke frames with two-valued accessibility relations. We
will denote this class byM. Moreover we will denote by BŁk
the axiomatic extension of the minimal modal logic with ax-
iom (K). Due to the presence of axiom (K), the monotonicity
rule can be replaced by the usual necessitation rule: if φ is a
theorem then Bφ is a theorem as well.
3 Fuzzy modal logics of belief
When defining logics for belief, it is usual to presume that
the agent has both positive and negative introspective capa-
bilities. This is captured in the classical case by the well-
known axioms (4) and (5). Moreover, sometimes belief con-
sistence is required which is captured by axiom (D). Finally,
when dealing with knowledge instead of beliefs, i.e. beliefs
are true, modal axiom (T) can be added. As we will show,
this can be generalized to our many-valued setting. Thus we
will consider some extensions of BŁk obtained by combining
the following classical modal axioms:
(K) B(φ→ ψ)→ (Bφ→ Bψ) (5) ¬Bφ→ B¬Bφ
(D) ¬B¬1 (T ) Bφ→ φ
(4) Bφ→ BBφ
As in the classical case [Chellas, 1980; Fagin et al., 1994],
we consider the following extensions of BŁk
• K45(Łk): BŁk plus axioms (4) and (5),
• KD45(Łk): BŁk plus axioms (D), (4) and (5)
• S5(Łk): BŁk plus axioms (T ), (4) and (5)
We will denote by `L the notion of proof for any of the
logics L ∈ {K45(Łk),KD45(Łk), S5(Łk)}. The next task
is to prove completeness of these logics1 with respect to cor-
responding classes of many-valued Kripke frames.
As was done for (fuzzy) autoepistemic logic [Blondeel et
al., 2013; Moore, 1983], each formula φ in LB can be seen
as a formula φ∗ in Łk by treating subformulas Bψ as new
propositional variables. For instance, B(a ∧ Bb) is seen as
a fresh variable pB(a∧Bb) and has no connection to Bb. Ex-
plicitly, for a variable p, truth-constant c, formulas φ and ψ
we define: p∗ = p, c∗ = c, (φ → ψ)∗ = φ∗ → ψ∗ and
(Bφ)∗ = pφ with pφ a new variable. As a first step, we show
a relation between proving a formula ψ in one of the exten-
sions of BŁk and proving the corresponding B-free formula
ψ∗ from a suitable theory over the propositional logic Łk. For
a set of formulas A, we define A∗ = {ψ∗ | ψ ∈ A}.
Lemma 3.1. Let L be any of the logics K45(Łk),
KD45(Łk), S5(Łk). Suppose T ∪ {ψ} is a set of formu-
las from LB and let ΛL = {φ∗ |`L φ}. Then it holds that
T `L ψ iff T ∗ ∪ ΛL ` ψ∗.
Proof. Suppose a proof for ψ in L from T has the form Γ =
(γ1, . . . , γm). A proof for ψ∗ in Łk from T ∗ ∪ ΛL is then
easily obtained by replacing all formulas γi in Γ by γ∗i .
Conversely, suppose there is a proof Φ = (φ1, . . . , φn)
for ψ∗ in Łk from T ∗ ∪ ΛL. For each i we then have that
φi = γ
∗
i with either γi ∈ T or γi an instantiation of an axiom
1We restrict ourselves to the logics K45(Łk), KD45(Łk) and
S5(Łk), but completeness results could be obtained for any of the
logics resulting from other combinations of the above axioms.
in L or γi = Bα with `L α. The sequence Γ = (γ1, . . . , γn)
obtained from Φ is then converted to a proof for ψ in L from
T as follows. If for some i, γi /∈ T and γi is not an axiom
in L, then add a proof for γi = Bα, which is possible since
in this case, it must hold that `L α from which we can then
infer that γi = Bα is a theorem as well.
The next step is to define the canonical Kripke frame for
a given modal logic L. The following definition is gen-
eral for any logic L resulting from all possible combina-
tions of the axioms (D), (4), (5) and (T ) and hence in
particular for L ∈ {K45(Łk),KD45(Łk), S5(Łk)}. The
L-canonical Kripke frame is defined as the Kripke frame
MLcan = (W
L
can, e
L
can, R
L
can), where
• WLcan = {w ∈ Ωk | ∀φ ∈ ΛL : w(φ∗) = 1} with
ΛL = {φ∗ | `L φ},
• RLcan = {(w1, w2) ∈ Ωk × Ωk | ∀φ : if w1((Bφ)∗) =
1, then w2(φ∗) = 1},
• eLcan(w, p) = w(p) for each variable p.
We now introduce some subclasses of M, depending on
which properties the two-valued accessibility relations in the
Kripke frames (W, e,R) satisfy.
• Met: class of Kripke frames with Euclidean2 and transi-
tive relations
• Mest: class of Kripke frames with Euclidean, serial and
transitive relations
• Mrst: class of Kripke frames with reflexive, symmetric
and transitive relations
In Theorem 3.4 we will show that the extensions of BŁk
defined above are sound and complete axiomatizations for
these subclasses of M. To show completeness, we need to
prove the following truth lemma (general for any L).
Proposition 3.2. (Truth-lemma) For any LB-formula φ, let
MLcan = (W
L
can, e
L
can, R
L
can) be its canonical Kripke frame
with L ∈ {K45(Łk),KD45(Łk), S5(Łk)}. Then it holds
that v(φ∗) = ‖φ‖MLcan,v , for every v ∈WLcan.
Proof. By using the monotonicity for B and the meet distri-
bution property, the claim follows by an easy adapation from
Lemma 4.20 in [Bou et al., 2011b].
We can now show the following properties for the canoni-
cal Kripke frames.
Proposition 3.3. Let L ∈ {K45(Łk),KD45(Łk), S5(Łk)},
then the following conditions hold
1. If L contains axiom (T ) then RLcan is reflexive.
2. If L contains axiom (4) then RLcan is transitive.
3. If L contains axiom (5) then RLcan is Euclidean.
4. If L contains axiom (D) then RLcan is serial.
2Recall that a relation R is called Euclidean if R(w1, w2) =
R(w1, w3) = 1 implies R(w2, w3) = 1 for each w1, w2, w3 ∈
Wcan and serial if for each w1 ∈W there exists w2 ∈W such that
R(w1, w2) = 1.
Proof. 1. Let w ∈ WLcan and w((Bφ)∗) = 1. Since (Bφ →
φ)∗ ∈ ΛL, it follows that 1 = w((Bφ → φ)∗) = ‖Bφ →
φ‖MLcan,w and hence that 1 = w((Bφ)∗) = ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w ≤
‖φ‖MLcan,w = w(φ∗). Therefore RLcan(w,w) = 1.
2. Let w1, w2, w3 ∈ WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) =
RLcan(w2, w3) = 1 and w1((Bφ)
∗) = 1. Since (Bφ →
BBφ)∗ ∈ ΛL, it follows that 1 = w1((Bφ → BBφ)∗) =
‖Bφ → BBφ‖MLcan,w1 , and hence that 1 = w1((Bφ)∗) =‖Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖BBφ‖MLcan,w1 = w1((BBφ)∗). Since
RLcan(w1, w2) = 1, it then follows that w2((Bφ)
∗) = 1 and
subsequently, since RLcan(w2, w3) = 1, that w3(φ
∗) = 1.
Hence RLcan(w1, w3) = 1.
3. Let w1, w2, w3 ∈ WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) =
RLcan(w1, w3) = 1 and w2((Bφ)
∗) = 1. By definition,
‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 = inf{‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w | RLcan(w1, w) = 1},
hence ‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w2 . Now since‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w2 = 1− ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w2 = 1− w2((Bφ)∗) = 0,
we obtain ‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 = 0. But since (¬B¬Bφ →
Bφ)∗ ∈ ΛL, it follows that
1 = w1((¬B¬Bφ→ Bφ)∗) = ‖¬B¬Bφ→ Bφ‖MLcan,w1
and hence 1 = ‖¬B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w1 =
w1((Bφ)
∗). Finally, since RLcan(w1, w3) = 1, it then follows
that w3(φ∗) = 1, and hence RLcan(w2, w3) = 1.
4. Let w1 ∈ WLcan. Since (¬B¬1)∗ ∈ ΛL, it follows
that 1 = w1((¬B¬1)∗) = ‖¬B¬1‖MLcan,w1 , and thus 0 =
‖B¬1‖MLcan,w1 = inf{‖0‖MLcan,w | RLcan(w1, w) = 1}.
Therefore the latter set must be non-empty, and hence there
must exist w2 ∈WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) = 1.
Using Proposition 3.3, we can now show the following the-
orem.
Theorem 3.4. K45(Łk), KD45(Łk) and S5(Łk) are sound
and complete w.r.t. the classes Met, Mest and Mrst respec-
tively.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. We can show the com-
pleteness by proving that if there is a formula φ such that
0L φ with L ∈ {K45(Łk),KD45(Łk), S5(Łk)}, then there
must exist a Kripke frame M = (W, e,R) in the correspond-
ing subclass of Kripke frames such that there exists w ∈ W
with ‖φ‖M,w < 1. We show that the L-canonical Kripke
frame meets this condition. The fact that each of these canon-
ical Kripke frames belong to the correct subclass of M fol-
lows from Proposition 3.3 and by the fact that a relation that is
reflexive and Euclidean is also symmetrical. By Lemma 3.1 it
follows, independently on L, that ΛL 0 φ∗ and by the strong
completeness of Łk it then follows that ΛL 2 φ, i.e. there
exists v ∈WLcan such that ‖φ‖Mcan,v = v(φ∗) < 1.
As in the classical case, the logics K45(Łk), KD45(Łk)
and S5(Łk) admit simpler semantics while preserving sound-
and completeness.
Consider the following classes of Kripke frames:
• Mset : the subclass of Kripke frames M = (W, e,R) of
Met where R = W × E for some E ⊆W
• Msest: the subclass of Kripke frames M = (W, e,R) of
Mest where R = W × E for some ∅ 6= E ⊆W
• Msrst: the subclass of Kripke frames M = (W, e,R) of
Mrst where R = W ×W
Proposition 3.5. K45(Łk), KD45(Łk) and S5(Łk) are
sound and complete w.r.t. the classes Mset, Msest and Msrst
respectively.
Proof. We only prove the case ofKD45(Łk), the other cases
being easy variations. By Theorem 3.4, it is sufficient to show
that Mest and Msest have the same tautologies. Since Msest is
a subclass ofMest, we only have to show that if for a formula
φ there exists M = (W, e,R) ∈ Mest and w ∈ W such
that ‖φ‖M,w < 1, that there exists M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′) ∈
Msest and w′ ∈ W ′ such that ‖φ‖M ′,w′ < 1. Suppose such
a frame M = (W, e,R) ∈ Mest and w ∈ W are given.
Define E = {v ∈ W | R(w, v) = 1}. By seriality of R
we have E 6= ∅. We define M ′ as follows: W ′ = {w} ∪
E, e′ = e|W ′×V and R′ = W ′ × E. Notice that for v ∈
E arbitrary we have E ⊆ {z | R(v, z) = 1} since R is
Euclidean and {z | R(v, z) = 1} ⊆ E since R is transitive.
Hence E = {z | R(v, z) = 1} for all v ∈ E. We can
now show by structural induction that for each ψ it holds that
‖ψ‖M,v = ‖ψ‖M ′,v for every v ∈ E. The only notable case
is when ψ = Bα, but this follows by the previous remark:
‖Bα‖M,v = inf{‖α‖M,v′ | v′ ∈ E} = ‖Bα‖M ′,v . Finally, it
is sufficient to show that ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖M ′,w. We do this by
structural induction, again we only show the case φ = Bψ:
‖Bψ‖M,w = inf{‖ψ‖M,v | v ∈ E} = inf{‖ψ‖M ′,v | v ∈
E} = ‖Bψ‖M ′,w.
4 Complexity of satisfiability problems
In this section we will discuss the complexity of two satisfia-
bility problems for KD45(Łk).
• 1-SAT: Given a formula φ, does there exist M =
(W, e,R) ∈Msest and w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w = 1?
• pos-SAT: Given a formula φ, does there exist M =
(W, e,R) ∈Msest and w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w > 0?
We will show that these problems are NP-complete and
hence generalizing to the many-valued case does not imply
an increase in computational complexity. See [Halpern and
Moses, 1992] for results on the complexity of classical modal
logics. As in the previous section, the same results can be
obtained for K45(Łk) and S5(Łk).
For any formula φ of LB, we denote by #φ its complexity:
• #c = 1 for each c ∈ Sk and #p = 1 for every proposi-
tional variable p
• #(φ→ ψ) = 1 + #φ+ #ψ and #(Bφ) = 1 + #φ.
For a formula φ of KD45(Łk) and a subformula ψ of φ,
the depth d(ψ) of ψ in φ is defined as usual given the tree of
subformulas of φ. For instance, for a formula B(a ∧ Bb), we
have d(B(a ∧ Bb)) = 0, d(a ∧ Bb) = 1, d(a) = d(Bb) = 2
and d(b) = 3. We can then show the following finite model
property:
Lemma 4.1. Let φ be a LB-formula. Then for every frame
M = (W, e,R) ∈ Msest, and for every w ∈ W , there exists a
finite frame M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′) ∈Msest and a world w′ ∈W ′
such that |W ′| ≤ #φ and ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖M ′,w′ .
Proof. Consider a frame M = (W, e,R) with R = W × E
and w ∈ W . The aim is to find a finite set W ′ and a non
empty subset E′ ⊆W ′ for which the claim holds.
Trivially, if φ is B-free, then take W ′ = E′ = {w}, R′ =
W ′ × E′ and let e′ be defined by restriction.
Otherwise, if φ is not B-free, let d be the maximum depth
of the subformulas of φ of the form Bψ.
If d = 0, then φ = Bψ and ψ is B-free. Then ‖Bψ‖M,w =
inf{‖ψ‖M,w∗ | w∗ ∈ E}. Now, since ‖ψ‖M,w∗ = e(w∗, ψ)
can only take a finite number of values in Sk, there exists
a world w0 ∈ W in which the infimum is attained, i.e.
‖Bψ‖M,w equals
inf{‖ψ‖M,w∗ | w∗ ∈ E} = ‖ψ‖M,w0 = e(w0, ψ).
In this case put W ′ = {w0}, w′ = w0 and let E′ and e′ be
defined by restriction.
If d > 0, let Bψd1, . . . ,Bψdrd be the subformulas of φ of
depth d, hence each ψdj is B-free. Again, for each ψdj , there
exists a world wdj such that
‖Bψdj‖M,w∗ = ‖ψdj‖M,wdj = e(wdj , ψdj)
with w∗ arbitrary. Now replace each subformula Bψdj by the
corresponding constant and repeat the process for all levels
n = d − 1, . . . , 0. Put W ′ = {w} ∪ {wlj | 1 ≤ l ≤ d, 1 ≤
j ≤ rl}, w′ = w and let E′ and e′ be defined by restriction to
W ′. Then, by construction, ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖M ′,w′ . Moreover,
|W ′| = 1 +∑dl=0 rl ≤ #φ.
Observe that, as in the proof of Lemma 4.1, given a for-
mula φ of KD45(Łk) and a frame M = (W, e,R), we can
construct an Łk formula φM .
Theorem 4.2. The problems 1-SAT and pos-SAT for
KD45(Łk) are NP-complete.
Proof. In order to prove NP-membership, recall that from
Lemma 4.1 a formula φ is 1-SAT in a frame M iff φ is 1-SAT
in a finite frame M ′ whose cardinality is polynomial in the
complexity of φ. Let us guess the frame M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′).
Since |W ′| ≤ #φ, the guess is polynomial in #φ. Let φM ′
the formula of Łk obtained from M ′ and φ applying the pro-
cedure described above, and notice that #φM
′
is polynomial
in #φ. Moreover, since |W ′| ≤ #φ the formula #φM ′ is
obtained in a number of steps which is polynomial in #φ.
From [Mundici, 1987] it follows that checking if φM
′
is ei-
ther 1-SAT or pos-SAT in Łk is NP, and hence our claim fol-
lows. Since each formula of Łk is in particular a formula of
KD45(Łk), and since both 1-SAT and pos-SAT for Łk are
NP-complete, the NP-hardness of our problems follows.
Notice that in [Bou et al., 2011a], the authors considered
these satisfiability problems for the minimal modal logic over
Łk, but with respect to generic Kripke frames where the ac-
cessibility relation can also be many-valued, and they proved
that those problems are PSPACE-complete.
5 Relating fuzzy modal logic and fuzzy
autoepistemic logic
The aim of Moore’s autoepistemic logic [Moore, 1983] is to
model or characterize the set of beliefs of a rational agent with
introspection capabilities by means of a set of simple proper-
ties it must fulfill. The language of fuzzy autoepistemic logic
is the same as LB, the one of the modal logic with the be-
lief operator B, so Bϕ is also read as “the agent believes ϕ”.
The basic construct is the notion stable expansion E of a set
of initial beliefs A, briefly introduced in Section 1. It can be
seen as the closed set of beliefs of an ideal rational agent re-
flecting on his own beliefs. This notion has been generalized
to the fuzzy case in [Blondeel et al., 2013] as follows. A sta-
ble fuzzy expansion of a set of LB-formulas A is a fuzzy set
EA : LB → Sk that satisfies the following fix-point condi-
tion:
EA(φ) = inf {v(φ∗) | v ∈ Ωk,
v(α) = 1, ∀α ∈ A∗ ∪ {(Bψ)∗ ↔ EA(ψ) | ψ ∈ LB}}.
Recall that EA(ψ) is the symbol corresponding to
EA(ψ) ∈ Sk.
Generalizing Moore’s result [Moore, 1984], in [Blondeel et
al., 2013] it is shown that stable fuzzy expansions can also be
characterized by a fuzzy Kripke-style possible world seman-
tics. In particular, a fuzzy autoepistemic structure is a pair
(w, S) with w ∈ Ωk representing the actual world used to
evaluate B-free formulas and S ⊆ Ωk representing all worlds
considered possible (epistemic states) used to evaluate for-
mulas of the form Bψ. The class of such structures will be
denoted by Mae. The degree of truth of a LB-formula φ rel-
ative to a fuzzy autoepistemic structure (w, S) is inductively
defined as follows:
• If φ is a propositional formula from L, then ‖φ‖(w,S) =
w(φ).
• If φ is a truth constant c, then ‖φ‖(w,S) = c.
• If φ = Bψ, then ‖Bψ‖(w,S) = inf{‖ψ‖(v,S) | v ∈ S}.
• if φ = ψ → γ, ‖φ‖(w,S) = (‖ψ‖(w,S) ⇒ ‖γ‖(w,S)).
Intuitively, one can think of S as a set of “sources” (worlds)
and we define the truth value of Bϕ in S as the minimal value
of ϕ such that each source supports it at least in this degree.
Since the truth evaluation of formulas of the form Bϕ in a
structure (w, S) does not depend on the actual wold w, we
will also write ‖Bϕ‖S to denote ‖Bϕ‖(w,S). Note that if S =
∅, then ‖Bϕ‖S = 1. Also note that, conversely, the world w
in (w, S) is needed to evaluate non-modal formulas.
We consider the following subclasses of fuzzy autoepistemic
structures ofMae:
• the class Maee , where only pairs (w, S) with S non-
empty are considered, and
• the classMaein ⊆Maee , where only pairs (w, S) with w ∈
S are considered.
It can be shown that K45(Łk), KD45(Łk) and S5(Łk) are
still sound and complete with respect to the classes Mae,Maee
andMaein respectively.
Theorem 5.1. K45(Łk), KD45(Łk) and S5(Łk) are sound
and complete w.r.t. to Mae,Maee andMaein, respectively.
Proof. We only show the case ofKD45(Łk). The other cases
are obtained by slight adaptions of the proof. By Proposition
3.5 it is sufficient to show that Msest and Maee have the same
tautologies. First suppose there exists M = (W, e,R) ∈
Msest and w ∈ W such that ‖φ‖M,w < 1 . Define (w, S) ∈
Maee such thatR = W×S. We can then show by structural in-
duction that for each formula γ we have ‖γ‖M,v = ‖γ‖(v,S)
for all v ∈ W . Next, suppose we have (w, S) ∈ Maee such
that ‖φ‖(w,S) < 1. Define M = (W, e,R) ∈ Msest as fol-
lows: W = {w} ∪ S and R = W × S. Similar as above it
follows that ‖γ‖M,w = ‖γ‖(w,S) for each formula γ.
In [Blondeel et al., 2013] the authors characterize stable
fuzzy expansions in terms of this possible world many-valued
semantics. Indeed, the fuzzy belief set BelS induced by an
epistemic state described by a set of Łk-evaluations S is de-
fined in the natural way: for each LB-formula ϕ
BelS(ϕ) = ‖Bϕ‖S = inf
w∈S
‖ϕ‖(w,S).
This notion also generalizes that of a S5-set to the many-
valued case. Moreover, given a set of formulas A, a set of
propositional evaluations SA is called a fuzzy autoepistemic
model of A whenever
SA = {w ∈ Ωk | ‖φ‖(w,SA) = 1 for each φ ∈ A}.
Intuitively, SA is the set of worlds or “sources” in which all
formulas of A are true. Then the following result is proved in
[Blondeel et al., 2013].
Proposition 5.2. A fuzzy set of formulas E : LB → Sk is
a stable fuzzy expansion of a set of formulas A iff it is the
belief set for some fuzzy autoepistemic model SA of A, i.e.
E(φ) = ‖Bφ‖SA for each φ ∈ LB.
On the other hand, as it happens in the classical case, we
can also characterize fuzzy belief sets, or equivalent stable
fuzzy expansions, by means of the syntactical notion of fuzzy
stable sets (c.f. [Halpern and Moses, 1992]).
Definition 5.3. Let Γ : LB → Sk be a fuzzy set and put
Γˆ = {Γ(ϕ) → ϕ∗ | ϕ formula }. We say that Γ is a fuzzy
stable set if the following conditions hold:
(1) Γˆ is propositionally consistent, i.e. Γˆ 6` 0.
(2) If Γˆ ` c¯→ ϕ∗ then Γ(ϕ) ≥ c.
(3) Γ(ϕ) = Γ(Bϕ)
(4) 1− Γ(ϕ) = Γ(¬Bϕ)
Proposition 5.4. Γ is a fuzzy stable set iff Γ is a fuzzy belief
set.
Proof. (1) First we show that a fuzzy belief set Γ is a fuzzy
stable set. By definition of a fuzzy belief set we know that
there exists S ⊆ Ωk such that Γ(ϕ) = ‖Bϕ‖S for each
formula ϕ. In order to show that Γˆ is propositionally con-
sistent, by the strong completeness of Łk, it is sufficient to
show that there exists v ∈ Ωk such that for each formula
ϕ we have Γ(ϕ) ≤ v(ϕ∗). Let w ∈ S be arbitrary but
fixed and define v such that v(ϕ∗) = ‖ϕ‖(w,S) for each ϕ.
It follows that Γ(ϕ) ≤ v(ϕ∗) which proves (1). Next, as-
sume that Γˆ ` c¯ → ϕ∗, or by strong completeness of Łk that
Γˆ |= c¯ → ϕ∗. We show that Γ(ϕ) ≥ c. Note, similar as
above, that for each w ∈ S we have that v with v(ϕ∗) =
‖ϕ‖(w,S) is a model of Γˆ and hence of c¯ → ϕ∗. Therefore
c ≤ ‖ϕ‖(w,S) for each w ∈ S and c ≤ infw∈S ‖ϕ‖(w,S) =
Γ(ϕ). Proving (3) follows easily by noting that Γ(ϕ) =
‖Bϕ‖S = ‖BBϕ‖S = Γ(Bϕ). Finally, to show (4), ob-
serve that Γ(¬Bϕ) = ‖B¬Bϕ‖S = infw∈S ‖¬Bϕ‖(w,S) =
infw∈S(1− ‖Bϕ‖(w,S)) = infw∈S(1− Γ(ϕ)) = 1− Γ(ϕ).
(2) Now, let Γ be fuzzy stable set. Define S = {u ∈ Ωk |
u(α) = 1,∀α ∈ Γˆ}. Note that S is nonempty by (1). Next,
note that for each w ∈ S we have by (3) that w((Bϕ)∗) ≥
Γ(Bϕ) = Γ(ϕ). We show that also w((Bϕ)∗) ≤ Γ(ϕ) from
which it then follows that w((Bϕ)∗) = Γ(ϕ) for each w ∈
S. Indeed, by (4) we have that Γ(ϕ) = 1 − Γ(¬Bϕ) and
since Γ(¬Bϕ) ≤ w((¬Bϕ)∗) = w(¬(Bϕ)∗), the latter is
greater or equal than 1 − w(¬(Bϕ)∗) = w((Bϕ)∗). We will
now show that for each formula α and each w ∈ S we have
w(α∗) = ‖α‖S from which we can conclude that Γ(ϕ) =
w((Bϕ)∗) = ‖Bϕ‖S for each formula ϕ and an arbitrary
w ∈ S 6= ∅. The only notable case is where α = Bψ. By
the induction hypothesis and by the definition of S we have
‖Bψ‖S = infv∈S ‖ψ‖(v,S) = infv∈S v(ψ∗) ≥ Γ(ψ). Now
suppose that for each w ∈ S we have w(ψ∗) > Γ(ψ). Since
the set of truth values is finite there exists w′ ∈ S such that
w′(ψ∗) = minw∈S w(ψ∗) and hence Γˆ ` w′(ψ∗) → ψ∗.
By (2), it then follows that Γ(ψ) ≥ w′(ψ∗) and hence that
Γ(ψ) > Γ(ψ), a contradiction.
The results from this section show that the modal logics
we are dealing with are suitable for reasoning in the fuzzy
autoepistemic frame. In particular, the following example il-
lustrates that real-world situations, which can be naturally ex-
pressed in the autoepistemic language, can also be framed in
our fuzzy modal setting.
Example 5.5. Consider the following example to show how
fuzzy autoepistemic logic can be used in a real world sce-
nario. Suppose we have a wireless sensor network consisting
of devices that can sense their environment and communicate
wirelessly, for instance with the purpose of detecting forest
fires in an early stage. We will use fuzzy autoepistemic logic
to determine whether there are sensors not working optimally
and if so, within what range we can assume the temperature
to be.
Let ti be the actual temperature at sensor i and t′i the tem-
perature measured by sensor i. Suppose we have an appropri-
ate rescaling to assure that all variables take values in Ωk and
let ei be the variable representing the degree to which sensor
i is faulty. The formula
¬Bei → (ti ↔ t′i) (1)
then captures a fuzzy version of the classical intuition that “If
we do not believe that the sensor i is broken, then it mea-
sures the right temperature”. Moreover, let us define a new
connective d(ϕ,ψ)3 as ¬(ϕ ↔ ψ) for which the semantics
3The connective d(ϕ,ψ) is well known in the literature of many-
is given by the Euclidean distance dˆ: for all x, y ∈ [0, 1],
dˆ(x, y) = |x− y| . The formula
(wij → d(t′i, t′j))→ ei ∨ ej (2)
then has the following intuitive meaning: “If the difference
between the measurements of sensors i and j is above some
threshold wij (to a certain degree), then there must be some-
thing wrong with one of the sensors. This value wij can for
instance be based on the location of the sensors i and j.
As a concrete example, suppose we have 2 sensors such
that the temperature measured by sensor 1 is equal to 0.4 and
by sensor 2 equal to 0.5. Suppose the threshold is equal to
0.2. For a fuzzy autoepistemic model S of formulas (1) and
(2), it must then hold for each w′ ∈ S that
(a) 0.4− infw∈S w(e1) ≤ w′(t1) ≤ 0.4 + infw∈S w(e1)
(b) 0.5− infw∈S w(e2) ≤ w′(t2) ≤ 0.5 + infw∈S w(e2)
(c) 0.9 ≤ max(w′(e1), w′(e2))
where (a) and (b) follow from the fact that (w′, S) must sa-
tisfy equation (1), and (c) from the fact that it must satisfy
equation (2). One can easily show that S = {w ∈ Ωk |
0.9 ≤ max(w(e1), w(e2)), w(t1) = 0.4, w(t2) = 0.5} is a
fuzzy autoepistemic model of formulas (1) and (2). In the cor-
responding stable fuzzy expansion E it holds E(t1) = 0.4,
E(t2) = 0.5, E(e1) = E(e2) = 0 and E(e1 ∨ e2) = 0.9.
Hence we can conclude that there is no error made by the
sensors.
6 “Only knowing” operators and fuzzy stable
expansions
Let us expand LB with a modal operator O such that a for-
mula Oψ has to be interpreted as “ψ is all that is believed”.
In the classical case [Levesque, 1990], the semantics is de-
fined as follows. Given a epistemic state S consisting of a set
of classical evaluations, a formulas Oψ is true in S when ψ
is true in any structure (z, S) with z ∈ S, and false in any
structure (z′, S) with z′ 6∈ S.
We can straightforwardly generalize this condition to the
many-valued case by defining
‖Oψ‖(w,S) = min( inf
z∈S
‖ψ‖(z,S), inf
z 6∈S
‖¬ψ‖(z,S)),
where now w ∈ Ωk and S ⊆ Ωk. Formulas of the form Bψ
are evaluated as in fuzzy autoepistemic logic. If we then add
another modal operator N whose truth evaluation in a pair
(w, S) is
‖Nψ‖(w,S) = inf
z/∈S
‖ψ‖(z,S),
then it is easy to see that the semantics of Oψ is exactly that
of Bψ ∧ N¬ψ. Notice that ‖Nψ‖(w,S) = ‖Bψ‖(w,Ωk\S),
so it is clear that N is another K45 operator. Again, since
the truth value of Oψ (and Nψ) in a structure (w, S) does
not depend on w, we will also write ‖Oψ‖S and ‖Nψ‖S to
denote ‖Oψ‖(w,S) and ‖Nψ‖(w,S) respectively.
valued logics and it is usually called Chang distance function [Cig-
noli et al., 2000]. The fact that d can be defined in a many-valued
logical setting is a peculiarity of MV-algebras and also for this rea-
son we believe these structures to be a suitable algebraic setting.
In [Levesque, 1990], Levesque proposes a sound and com-
plete axiomatization for the classical logic of “only know-
ing”. It is worth noticing that all axioms are also valid in
our fuzzy framework. We will check in particular the ones
involving both operators:
Lemma 6.1. The following formula schemas are valid:
(i) φ → Bφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur
in the scope of an operator N or B,
(ii) φ → Nφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur
in the scope of an operator N or B,
(iii) ¬Bφ ∨ ¬Nφ, if ¬φ is satisfiable and does not contain
any modal operators.
Proof. Schemas (i) and (ii) are easy to check. For condi-
tion (iii), suppose ¬φ is satisfiable, i.e. there exists a struc-
ture (w′, S′) such that w′(φ) = ‖φ‖(w′,S′) = 0. For
a structure (w, S) we have ‖¬Bφ ∨ ¬Nφ‖(w,S) = 1 iff
max(‖¬Bφ‖(w,S), ‖¬Nφ‖(w,S)) = 1 iff ‖Bφ‖(w,S) = 0 or
‖Nφ‖(w,S) = 0 iff there exists z ∈ S such that z(φ) =
‖φ‖(z,S) = 0 or there exists z /∈ S such that z(φ) =
‖φ‖(z,S) = 0. The latter is satisfied by the fact that there
exists w′ ∈ Ωk such that w′(φ) = 0.
Notice that (i) and (ii) are more general than both modal
axioms (4) and (5) (see Section 3). The question of whether
axioms (i), (ii) and (iii), together with the minimal modal
logic axioms for B and for N, provide a complete axiom-
atization with respect to the above semantics as well as its
complexity is left as future work. We can only advance now
that the logic is decidable since a re-adaptation of Lemma
4.1 easily shows that the “only knowing” logic over finitely-
valued Lukasiewicz logic has the finite model property. Noth-
ing about the complexity can be stated up to now, since no
polynomial bound on the cardinality of the model has been
fixed so far.
Nonetheless, we can show that the relationship between
the “only knowing” operator O and Moore’s stable expan-
sions proved in [Levesque, 1990] nicely extends to our fuzzy
framework with some slight variations. First of all, observe
that if a formula Oϕ gets value 1 in an epistemic state S, then
necessarily ϕ must be Boolean.
Lemma 6.2. For any formula ϕ, if ‖Oϕ‖S = 1 then
‖ϕ‖(v,S) = 1 for every v ∈ S and ‖ϕ‖(v′,S) = 0 for every
v′ 6∈ S, hence ϕ is Boolean.
Next proposition shows that the belief setBelS for an epis-
temic state defined by a set of Łk-evaluations S is indeed a
stable fuzzy expansion of a Boolean premise ϕ whenever ϕ
is all what is fully believed in the epistemic state S.
Proposition 6.3. For any Boolean LB-formula ϕ, ‖Oϕ‖S =
1 iff BelS is a stable fuzzy expansion of A = {ϕ}.
Proof. Since ‖Oϕ‖S = min(‖Bϕ‖S , ‖N¬ϕ‖S), we have
the following chain of equivalences:
‖Oϕ‖S = 1 iff ‖Bϕ‖S = 1 and ‖N¬ϕ‖S = 1
iff ∀v ∈ S, ‖ϕ‖(v,S) = 1 and
∀v /∈ S, ‖ϕ‖(v,S) = 0
iff S = {v ∈ Ωk | ‖ϕ‖(v,S) = 1}
iff S is a fuzzy AE model of A
iff BelS is a stable fuzzy expansion of A.
where the last equivalence follows from Prop. 5.2. Notice
that the third “iff” is valid only in case ϕ is Boolean.
7 Related work and conclusions
In this paper we have introduced Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tions of fuzzy modal logics for belief based on finitely-valued
Łukasiewicz logic, in particular of many-valued counterparts
of the well-known K45, KD45 and S5 modal logics. We have
shown they provide possible-world semantics for a fuzzy au-
toepistemic logic, generalizing some bridges established in
the classical case in [Levesque, 1990]. In the last years there
has been some work on fuzzy modal logics with generalized
Kripke semantics, see e.g. [Bou et al., 2011b] and references
therein. Here we have focused on modal systems based on
a finite set of linearly ordered truth-values with Łukasiewic
logic semantics for connectives which generate the class of fi-
nite MV-algebras [Mundici, 1987]. These systems represent a
good compromise between expressive power and nice logical
properties. The infinitely-valued case offers some problems,
see e.g. [Ha´jek, 2010] for the case of S5 with total accessi-
bility relations. On the other hand, a closely related work is
Maruyama’s paper [Maruyama, 2011], where modal logics
for belief based on a finitely-valued Heyting algebra of truth-
values and hence not necessarily linearly ordered are consid-
ered. The formalization is very similar, but he also deals with
common belief. Here we rather focus on providing a formal
basis for the fuzzy generalization of autoepistemic logic de-
veloped in [Blondeel et al., 2013]. Many-valued extensions
of autoepistemic logic have also been addressed by Fitting
[Fitting, 1992] in the context of finite Heyting algebras of
truth-values, as well as by Koutras et al. [Koutras and Za-
chos, 2000; Koutras et al., 1999]. As for future work, we
plan to fully develop the “only believing” logic with the two
modal operators O and N, and extend the modal approach to
possibly other fuzzy logics.
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